

SECRET

DDI #01774-84/1

2 April 1984

Att. DDE 01869-84  
ER 84-1151

NOTE TO: Director of Central Intelligence  
 FROM : Deputy Director for Intelligence  
 SUBJECT: Your Memo on North Korea (and others)

1. In response to your note, you may have missed two recent papers on North Korea that provide economic, political and sociological information about North Korea providing us with early warning information. Indeed, [redacted] sent a special note to the authors on the value of these papers (which I attach). Beyond these two papers, you should be aware that our East Asian Office is drafting a paper on North Korean activities around the world which we expect to have by the end of next month. [redacted]

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Robert M. Gates

## Attachments:

North Korea: Assuring Civilian Response to  
 Military Needs, dtd21Feb84, [redacted] Cy 17  
 Factors Driving North Korea's Behavior, dtdMar84,  
 EA 84-10045, SECRET  
 D/OGI Memo, dtd30Mar84

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EXEC  
REQC-315<sup>av</sup>

DDI 01774-84/1

SUBJECT: DCI Memo on North Korea (and others)

Distribution:

Original - DCI [redacted] CY 17, OGI 30 Mar 84 memo,  
and EA 84-10045

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1 - DDI w/o att

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DDI/RMGates/de/ [redacted] (2 April 1984)

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FBI- 01774/54

30 MAR 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM: [REDACTED]

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Director of Global Issues.

SUBJECT: DCI Request re North Korea

1. We have discussed the Director's proposal with representatives from NESA, OEA, ALA, and EURA. OEA has begun to draft a paper on North Korean activities around the world. A draft is expected by the end of May. EURA has taken two of its analysts to begin research on an assessment of Bulgarian activities; a draft should be ready by the end of September. The Communist Activities Branch of the International Security Issues Division and the Insurgency and Political Instability Branches of the Instability and Insurgency Center will support these efforts. The Political Instability Branch is preparing an assessment of the factors that influence Third World countries to acquire Soviet weapons and the gains that accrue to the Soviets from these decisions. In addition, the Communist Activities Branch has begun work on a paper that reviews Cuban external activities that should be ready by the end of August.

2. In addition to these papers the DDI Research Program for 1984 includes a number of papers that address the issues raised by the Director. These include:

- Soviet Activity in Grenada
- Angola and Its Communist Backers
- Insurgent Training by Soviets and Surrogates
- South Yemen: Hasani's Balancing Act-Prospects Limitations
- Cuba's Evolving Relations with South America
- Horn of Africa: The Dissident Movements
- Libya's Posture in Africa
- Upper Volta: Going Radical?

All portions classified SECRET

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SUBJECT: DCI Request re North Korea

As we review this year's Research Program and begin to plan next year's, the Directorate should continue to look for opportunities to write these kinds of papers. They require a significant investment in research and analyst time, but as the Director's request makes clear there is significant interest in this kind of analysis.


3. The Directorate has already made a good start in doing this kind of work. During 1983 the various offices prepared a series of papers that examine the efforts of Communist or other countries hostile to the United States to extend their influence regionally and globally:

- Soviet and International Fronts: Spotlight on the "Peace" Campaign
- Training LDC Personnel: Moscow's Investment in Political Penetration
- The Cuban Educational Assistance Program: An Investment in the Third World
- East Germany: Soviet Partner in the LDCs
- Soviet and East European Military Transfers to Non-Communist LDCs, 1982
- The USSR and Its Allies: A Global Perspective
- Libyan Military Aid: Trying to Buy Influence
- Syrian Terrorism: An Instrument of Government Policy
- Terrorist Activity in Response to the Grenada Operation
- State Support for International Terrorism
- Iran: Spreading Islam and Terrorism
- East European Involvement in the Gray Arms Market
- The African National Congress: Organization, Strategy, and Communist Ties
- Cuba: Castro's Propaganda Apparatus and Foreign Policy

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SUBJECT: DCI Request re North Korea

- Grenada: The Cuban Factor
- Nicaragua: Economic Restructuring in the Communist Mold
- Peru-USSR: Implications of the Military Relationship



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DDI-0869/84  
AH.ER84-1151

21 March 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM: [redacted]

Director of East Asian Analysis

SUBJECT: Ambassador Walker's Concerns About North Ko

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1. I fully agree with the concerns expressed by Ambassador Walker (see attached memorandum). We have targeted North Korea as one of our primary concerns and are increasing the number of personnel working on that country in order to increase our output and exploit new sources of special, sensitive information.

2. For Fiscal Year 1984, we have four projects that draw on the special intelligence of which Ambassador Walker spoke: these are studies on government operations, the military-industrial complex, training patterns, and intervention by the military in the civilian economy. This last subject was covered in a typescript entitled, "North Korea: Assuring Civilian Response to Military Needs." Issued in February 1984, it drew praise from [redacted] as a "superb step toward enhancing early warning in Korea."

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3. Regarding the specific issue of P'yongyang's activities overseas, I have assigned our senior Korean political analyst to work with OGI in updating our studies on this subject. We view the question of North Korean international influence as a vital one. I have just reviewed a typescript on the sale of arms to Iran and Iraq by both Koreas and place a high priority on undertaking more comprehensive surveys.

4. [redacted] Chief of our Northeast Asia Division, and [redacted] Chief of the Korea Branch, will be visiting Seoul in early April. We intend to use this visit to continue our dialogue with Ambassador Walker.

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Attachment:  
as stated.

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**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**  
**ROUTING SLIP**

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		✓		
2	DDCI		✓		
3	EXDIR		✓		
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI	✓			
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
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13	D/EEO				
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16	C/PAO				
17	SA/IA				
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Remarks

Executive Secretary

3/9/84  
Date

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Executive Registry
54-1151

9 March 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence  
 FROM: Director of Central Intelligence  
 SUBJECT: North Korea

Ambassador Dixie Walker was in for lunch yesterday, full of ideas. He pressed particularly on two things.

The first is to mine more carefully for economic, political and sociological information about North Korea which provides us with early warning information. There appears to be reams of material which are not worked over. I inquired about the South Koreans yesterday on this. They apparently don't do much and his view is they would see it through a different kind of prism and that it is something to which we should pay more attention. Both [redacted] were there and took this on board so you can strike that from your list. I will expect that that issue will be addressed satisfactorily but you might want to follow up on it.

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Secondly, Walker has said that we are missing an opportunity to get a better understanding of what it is that has extended North Korean activity and influence so widely around the world. What things they offer? What is the nature of their protective security and security services, their economic and construction activity and their arms sales? What did we learn about their rationale and the contribution of the 17 or so North Koreans who we found in Grenada? What can we learn from other countries who had them there and kicked them out or otherwise terminated the relationship. What will all this tell us about where they will be next, what they are likely to do, what we can do to counter or head it off? Your Directorate just did something close to this on Libya. I would like to suggest that we develop the same kind of comprehensive catalogue of the nature and capabilities of the Libyan, North Korean, East German, Cuban, South Yemen, Bulgarian capabilities for destabilization, fostering and supporting insurgency, and securing the hold of Marxist governments that you have just completed on how Iran, Syria, Libya, the East Bloc, Cuba, et al, foster and use terrorist organizations around the world. This would be a companion piece on an equally serious threat, both of which are somewhat intertwined in nature and purpose.



William J. Casey

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